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From: Tracy Burr Strong: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration

Chapter IX
THE

~TRINE

OF

ETERNAL RETURN
The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the
mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for tbe
sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only
through a changed mode of thought, not tbrough a
medicine invented by an i11dividuaL

-Ludwig Wittgcnstcin, Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics

We are reachiing the end of a journey through
Nietzsche. I have tried to establish that the nihilism besening the
Western world lies, in Nietzsche's analysis, so deep as to require a
change in the very stuff of humanity. Everything is in error, all will
have to be made new. The task of transfiguration seems, however, to
be made impossible by Nietzsche's investigations of the will to
power. He finds the will to power that which gives form to any
existence. Form, however, must be given in terms of what is, and the
problem immediately arises as to how beings who are radically
flawed, who are human-all-too-human, can in fact transfigure themselves. Must not everything they do suffer from what they are?
Nietzsche seeks an answer to this problem in the doctrine of
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eternal return. In this concluding chapter, I shall try to explicate this,
the most difficult and obscure portion of Nietzsche's thought. Without an understanding of eternal return, I believe, the rest of Nietzsche is very little different from the writings of many other nineteenth- and twentieth-century cultural critics. Without the doctrine
of eternal return, it is difficult to take seriously Nietzsche's claims of
preparing a new transvaluation of values on the order of those
effectuated by Socrates and Christ.
Eternal return presents problems to all commentators. Not only
does Nietzsche give even less of an account of it than he does of the
will to power, but furthermore, as a concept, it appears to fly in the
face of common sense. If Nietzsche seriously intends to suggest that
everything always comes back the same, and means by that that the
present configuration of the universe will repeat itself and has already repeated itself countless times, one simply doesn't know what
to say. Such a notion, even if true, can only have a heuristic
significance for the practical life of human beings, since, obviously,
they are destined to pass away, only to reappear again and again and
again always unchanged. As such, the doctrine hardly seems worth
taking seriously, except, perhaps, in the light of offering some new
form of moral behavior by which the individual might relate his
choices to a universal principle.1
Beyond the fact that, interpreted as a cosmic cyclical vision,
eternal return doesn't seem to make much sense, there are additional
difficulties. Nietzsche claims explicitly in Ecce Homo that eternal
return forms the "fundamental conception" of Zarathustra, and
constitutes the "highest formula of affirmation that is attainable"; he
links "the philosophy of eternal return" with Dionysos as the sign
and indicator of the transvaluation of values which he is seeking to
achieve. 2 It would seem, then, that we will attain an accurate
interpretation of what Nietzsche means by eternal return only if we
can at least show how Nietzsche could have thought eternal return to
be a " fundamental conception." It is necessary to note here that
there is no a priori reason to see the will to power as somehow
leading to eternal return; the analysis in the previous chapter gives no
indication that there is a necessary link. In fact, Nietzsche, as far as I
have been able to ascertain, with one possible exception always
speaks of the two separately.
Nietzsche's method of exposition raises even more problems in
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this case than it does in that of the will to power. He writes to Gast
from Sils Maria on the fourteenth of August, 1881, that " thoughts
have arisen such as I have never seen before" and hastens to add that
he "will not speak of them, but will keep [his] unshakable peace. "
His account of a "vision" of eternal return, "six thousand feet above
men and time" as he writes in Ecce Homo , and his subsequent
furtiveness and secrecy in discussing it (mostly with Lou Salome) are
well-known. For whatever reasons, he apparently thought it was
something that could not simply be said. In Zarathustra, the main
exposition of eternal return comes in a chapter that ends with a
riddle ("The Vision and the Riddle"); it is probably fair to surmise
that this chapter constitutes some son of account of the vision that
he, Nietzsche, had on the plain between Sils and Silvaplana in the
Swiss Engadin, and that he still finds the " riddle" to be the only
possible means of expounding it. It is certainly true, and he writes
Gast to this effect from Sils at the end of August, 1883 , that
Zarathustra is a structured book, each portion of which, in Nietzsche's mind at least, "forms a basis" for the subsequent portion.
Zart~thustra, however, was never completed. There do exist plans for
a major book to be entitled " Philosophy of Eternal Return: An
Attempt at the Transvaluation of All Values." And, while there are
hints as early as the first book of The Gay Science of something
apparently resembling the notion of eternal return, 3 the doctrine
itself is announced only in the second book of Zarathustra, dealt
with in the third and fourth, and not mentioned again in finished
work until Ecce Homo. In any case, Nietzsche never actually says
what eternal return is; the reason seems to be that men, as Zarathustra discovers in his ftrSt pub~ic appearance, "have not yet the
ears" for such a new thought. 4 At the end of Zarathustra, the reader
has a distinct feeling of dissatisfaction : something has happened to
Zarathustra, but Nietzsche does not say what it is.
These preliminary considerations do serve a purpose, though. They
give me some clear ground, making it possible to say what eternal
return is not. If Nietzsche means anything, whatever he means will
have to occupy a central, decisive, and coherent place in his thought
as a whole. To begin by asserting that "all that is 'great' in Nietzsche
no longer is so for our time ... [and that] Nietzsche is great for us
because of his 'little' sociological and social finds" 5 is to prejudge the
issue. Similarly, Jaspers, for instance, finds Nietzsche's greatness in
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that he "moves men 's minds"; for Kaufmann, eternal return is "a
most dubious doctrine which was to have no influence to speak of,"
which as a doctrine "transforms a fruitful notion into a rigid crudity. " 6 Whatever the validity of these conclusions, they cannot be
what Nietzsche thought, since none of them would allow the doctrine the central importance Nietzsche ascribed to it. They are, in
fact, an intellectual operation which Nietzsche repeatedly criticized:
they constitute an " as-if" on which to ground existence. Nietzsche,
as we have seen, devotes much time to attacking world views and
philosophical stances of which the most important member can only
be intuited, or is in principle unknowable. In fact, notions such as
the above are a way to avoid taking Nietzsche seriously; they proceed
on the assumption that Nietzsche could not have meant anything real
by eternal return. The doctrine is then judged either fruitful or not,
depending on how the commentator approaches it.
I shall proceed here on the assumption that Nietzsche is being
perfectly straightforward when he speaks of moving from the human
to the over-human and thinks that eternal return can accomplish this.
To do this, I shall avoid coming to conclusions about what Nietzsche
" must" have meant and rather try to fmd out if he could have been
saying anything meaningful, given the other terms of discourse that
he sets for himself. An understanding of eternal return which makes
no sense of the rest of Nietzsche is probably wrong.
In any case, my considerations above seem to me to eliminate a
number of understandings on a purely methodological basis. Danto,
Jaspers, Kaufmann, and the others cannot give us an understanding
of eternal return which only either makes little sense of or contradicts other .important portions of Nietzsche's writing. Having discarded these views, we are still in somewhat of a quandary, for when
we turn to the few substantive things Nietzsche did say about eternal
return, we find that they are not set out in direct statements, but
rather in an exposition in a " vision and a riddle." I shall shortly give
some indications why Nietzsche chooses this mode; firstly , I must set
out the terms of the riddle.
The chapter "On the Vision and the Riddle" in the third book of
Zaratbustra is full of complex symbols, all of which have general
meaning for Nietzsche. Zarathustra is recounting to some sailors his
vision of climbing a mountain, while carrying on his back "his
archenemy, the spirit of gravity - half dwarf, half mole." 7 This
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creature represents the inverse of Zarathustra: he is 'the same person
who jumped over the tightrope walker in the first book, a person
who seems to overcome the human-all-too-human, but must in fact
be carried along by someone else or skip necessary stages of development. Zarathustra fi nally calls a halt to bearing this burden, and the
dwarf jumps off and squats beside· him. Despite the dwarf's tenacity,
he is not able to bear Zarathustra's " most abysmal thought. " This
thought is not, as the dwarf would have it, that time runs in a circle.
Such a doctrine would be a caricature of Zarathustra, just as the
spirit of gravity will be a caricature of Zarathustra's lightness. The
abysmal thought is named " eternal return."
Zarathustra wonders aloud to the dwarf if they have not all been
here before, whispering as they are now, under the gateway of
moment, with time running in a straight line backward and forward
into the past and future. Then, of a sudden , Zarathustra hears a dog
howl, feels pity, and everything around him vanishes. A riddle is
about to be proposed, that of eternal return. 8 Zarathustra sees a
shepherd in whose mouth has bitten fast a large black serpent. He
recoils in horror, and cries out to the youth to bite off the head of
the serpent. The youth does so, spits it out , and is immediately
transformed, apparently made new in the act of biting and expelling.
As part of the riddle, Zarathustra asks his audience whom he has seen
and what he has seen. This riddle is posed before the shepherd bites
the serpent's head off. In appearance, and for some commentators,
the presentation of eternal return is broken off at the end of this
chapter,9 but in appearance only. Zarathustra has not yet the
"strength and lion 's voice" to summon eternal return.
In fact , the vision that Zarathustra has had renders him sick and
nauseous. By the end of the third book he is no more than convalescent. He is still divided in himself : "Acting as if someone else were
still lying in his place who refused to get up . . . Zarathustra ...
spoke these words: 'Up abysmal thought; out of my depth ; I am
your cock and dawn, sleepy worm . .. and when you are awake you
will stay awake eternally .... " 10 Even here Zarathustra is still not
strong enough to support his thought. It causes so much nausea that
he again falls down senseless and remains thus for seven days - the
time of creation. When he awakens, his animals attempt to comfort
him by asserting the beauty of a purely cyclical version of eternal
return. Zarathustra rebukes them: " Oh you buffoon and barrel
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organs. . . . Have you already made a hurdy-gurdy song out of
this? 11 The animals then refuse to let him proceed with an explanation of the true nature of eternal return; he is still a convalescent and
must "cure his soul." The animals can probably assen a cyclical
understanding without suffering nausea because, as Nietzsche points
out at the beginning of The Use and Disadvantage of History for
Life, they do not suffer from the "historical malady ." The notion
can be quite acceptable to them, but for men it is a hurdy-gurdy
song, a mechanistic parody of creative art. 12
This presentation does allow some steps forward . In the first place,
whatever eternal return is, it is not a theory of the cosmos. The state
of being of an individual (and of an animal, in the example above)
seems to make the difference. The thought has to be " awakened" by
Zarathustra, that is, he has to do something or act differently for it
to come "out of [his] depth." The shepherd is transfigured by his
act, and he laughs "as no man has ever laughed before." In a late
note, Nietzsche proclaims, "when you incarnate the thought of
thoughts in yourself, it will change you." 13 It is wrong, says Nietzsche - in fact, "one must guard against it" - to think of eternal
return on the example of the "stars, or the ebb and flow, day and
night, seasons.... " 14 The focus of most of Nietzsche's comments
seems to be human beings, their souls and bodies. Once Zarathustra
overcomes the dissociation of himself and that body lying there as if
" in his place," his convalescence will be over. He will then " be awake
[and] will stay awake eternally. " It appears from these texts that we
must look upon eternal return at least as the description of a
particular manner of existing.
Secondly, the emphasis on what will happen when the " thought of
thoughts" comes, casts considerable doubts on the notion that eternal return is the return of everything "always the same." As long as
we mean by "always the same" that everything will come cyclically
back and that there is no change, it seems we mean something other
than what Nietzsche does. He speaks of eternal return as the "pivot
point of history," 15 and of himself as " breaking history in two" ;
above, as we saw, he explicitly rejects analogies to cyclical notions of
time. Indeed, this is hardly surprising. In Ecce Homo, he finds his
idea of eternal return to be an entirely new idea, approached only
perhaps by Heraclitus, and discovered "six thousand feet above men
and time. " It is unlikely that a man well acquainted with Hinduism
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and an expert on things Greek might have thought cyclicism a new
idea. Part of the source of this. confusion comes from a misunderstanding of the meaning of "eternity." For Nietzsche, eternity does
not "become," it has no past and future. 16 It simply is: the exterior
provided for the scene with the dwarf and the shepherd in the
chapter "On the Vision and the Riddle" takes place under the
gateway of moment, in stopped time, as it were, for dramatic
evidence. When something is eternal, it is with one always. It does
not stretch out into infinity, since it is eternally present. 17
Thirdly, whatever eternal return is, it is concerned with the question of how human beings deal wi·t h their past and their history. The
Genealogy of Morals and the first book of Zarathustra establish the
fact and the problem of the death of God. The rest of Zarathustra is
the investigation of the consequences of that problem, both actual
and to come. As we saw in the previous chapter, by the end of the
second book, in "On Redemption," Nietzsche sets out as a central
issue the question of the relation of the past and futu.re to the
present. Both memory and the past are now, in Nietzsche's views,
problems and weights to men ; yet, in his understanding, there can be
neither going back nor, a la Hegel or Marx, the hope for a solution
from the practical inertia of historical logic. Men cannot, for Nietzsche, escape time. It is the effort to remove oneself from history
which Nietzsche sees at the root of the various attempts at redemption: Hegel, Kant, Schopenhauer, along with the Christians before
them and science after, all maintain the existence of a world of
transcendental concept(s) (be this God, theoretical reason, the Geist,
the laws of physics), as the source for a solution to the problems of
earthly being. 18 " Redemption" consists in escaping from this world
to that one, or, conversely, having that world take this one over.
Given, however, Nietzsche's general hostility to such notions of
transcendence and two-worldliness, it is unlikely that he would assert
the possibility or desirability of escaping the reality of time.
It then seems that interpreters of Nietzsche who see men as
constantly "overcoming" themselves and rising higher and higher in a
long succession of overmanliness miss the key point. If the chapter
" On Redemption " establishes that man cannot " escape" time, and
yet time is a problem, then men will have to find a manner of
being-in-time so different that it no longer frames a problem. Failing
such an existence, one can only adopt the traditional metaphysical
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stances, or possibly the cynical cyclicism of the dwarf. In the
doctrine of eternal return, Nietzsche then tries to evolve an understanding of a human relation to time which is neither a circle, nor a
straight line running backward and forward. 19 One might formulate
this question as follows. " Evolve a form of life in which the past
never presents itself as a problem (one might say, as a source of
neurosis or cyclical compulsion) and in which men (as contrary to
animals) are nevertheless self-conscious." Nietzsche's vision here is
breathtakingly specific and grandiose. He is concerned that his teaching " slowly sink in as to how generations must build and be fruitful
on the basis of it - so that finally it becomes a great tree and
overshadows the corning humanity. (Two thousand years for Christianity - many thousand for this.) " 20 From this, it appears that
Nietzsche is talking about conscious breeding or evolving of life, no
longer human-all-too-human, and that this will or can come about
because of the teaching of eternal return.
So far, I have not said very much about what eternal return is;
rather, I have given some indications as to how it might be recognized. If this is a doctrine which cannot yet be taught because there
is no audience for it, then saying what it is will do no good. In fact, it
might be harmful. "One only understands these things when they
have been achieved in practice, " writes Nietzsche as early as a note
from the seventies. 21 To attempt to say them directly, as Nietzsche
is increasingly tempted to do, or, at the end of his life, finds
necessary, lays open the possibility of being dangerously misread and
misused. 22 ("Above all, do not mistake me," he warns in Ecce
Homo. ) Hence, as a writer, he "dramatizes his ideas," 23 and fashions
them in such a way that understanding can only come from having
lived through them. Zaratbustra is a recognition of this on a large
scale: its doctrine is presented in " a book for all," the true meaning
of which is not available (" a book for none" ), which is perhaps why
Nietzsche thought that anyone who had truly understood six sentences of Zaratbustra would have accomplished a great thing. The
ideas are "dramatized" in the sense that Nietzsche brings them on
stage and sets them to work. Understanding comes by the grasping
and acknowledging of the coherence of their interaction. Eternal
return is first conceived in a manner that makes Zarathustra nauseous. He has only been able to express it to sailors, themselves already
Sucher-Versucber, in the form of a riddle. Riddles, I have suggested

268 )

THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL RETURN

before, can be characteristic forms of philosophical discourse when
one is attempting to get something across for which nothing other
than perfect clarity will suffice. "What is black and white and red all
over?" One is presented with fragments of a world and is asked for
the logic that would make them a picture. After initial confusion, if
the answer is come up with , that is, once the bits are tied together in
a picture, as "an embarrassed zebra" or "a bloody nun," the problem
no longer exists. A riddle can't be asked twice, because after the first
time, one has got it. However, the answer to a riddle doesn't come
just from the pieces of information provided in the question; the
answer has to be made. Once you have it, there is no problem
anymore; but until then, it remains a mystery.
As with riddles, so with Nietzsche on eternal return. Here, though,
the problem is complicated by the fact that the reader does not
know a priori what counts as portions of the answer. This, as
suggested, is partly due to the subject material, but also to what
appears to be Nietzsche's inability to finish anything that contained
creative themes. 24 The reader can only follow out the leads given
and hope to discover the journey they describe.
The Problem of Audience

I have pointed out above that eternal return is not something that
can be taught, and that it seems to require a particular state of being
in order to be able to understand and achieve it (the shepherd is
transformed, Zarathustra is rendered nauseous). To me, this indicates
that eternal return must operate more than just in thought. Since a
particular type of person both experiences and understands eternal
return , the doctrine cannot be eff.ected only in the world of ideas. If
there were no way in which the process of individual change might
affect the process of general social change, Nietzsche would be
contributing nothing more than a Hegelianized version of Kant.
Some interpreters have indeed professed to find, in the doctrine of
eternal return, analogies to the Kantian cateJorical imperative, to
which Nietzsche adds a historical dimension. 2 To escape the judgment that eternal return is nothing more than esoteric Kant, one
must show that what is seemingly merely a form of individual
conception or understanding can have specific and actual human (I
might more properly say "anthropological") consequences. 26
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Zarathustra understands this. " It is not enough to bring a teaching;
one must also forcibly alter men , so they adopt it.... " 2 7 Men are
not changing, for their relation to the nihilism afflicting Europe is
"passive" ; they "allow it to happen to them. " 28 Should men attempt to directly overcome decadence as such , as Socrates did, they
will only bring it back in a cyclical fashion, for no matter what
specific historical circumstances may bring, the genealogical root will
always be there. There have even, in fact, arisen forces that tend to
ensure that the shape of modern morality will always be repeated.
Such, for example, is the ascetic priest, who has as his historical
mission to be " the predestined savior, shepherd.• and advocate of the
sick herd. " 29 Here the repetition of this form of nihilism maintains
life inside the pattern of slave morality, even though this pattern has
reached complete logical emptiness. " The ascetic priest," says Nietzsche, " this apparent enemy of life, the deny-er, precisely he is among
the great conserving and yes-creating forces of life. " 30 The life the
ascetic priest preserves is the passive, accepting, nihilistic one. He
provides a moral cloak for the schlecht-weggekommene, the " badly
developed," who can maintain life only through "passion extirpation." 31 Without the ascetic priest, "the oppressed man would
perceive that he stands on the same ground as the oppressor and has
no individual privilege, no higher rank than the latter. . . Admitting
this belief in morality could be destroyed, the badly developed
would no longer have any comfort and perish." 32 In other words,
unless one can destroy the means by which people keep themselves
in their present slavely moral condition, there will be no possibility
of escaping it. Nietzsche goes on to indicate that this process will be
accomplished through a means of self-destruction. "The perishing
[Zugrunde-gehen] presents itself as a self-condemnation [Sichzugrunde-richten], as the instinctive selection of that which must
destroy." 33 Already in the Prologue to Zaratbustra, Nietzsche devotes much attention and praise to those men who wish to " go
under." 34
Earlier in the section of the Nacblass cited in the previous paragraph, Nietzsche indicates that eternal return may finally break the
hold that European nihilism has on men. It appears that if "the
unhealthiest men are infected by" eternal return, it will provoke a
"crisis," the value of which is that " it purifies," for it will "extirpate
everything that is meaningless and aimless." 35 This appears to mean
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that eternal return, if "infecting" men in the last stage of slave
morality, will unroot the nihilism reigning in them. This would be
the " completion of nihilism," which the ascetic priest has been
holding at bay. And, for Nietzsche, it represents the " period of the
catastrophy," which sees the advent of "a teaching which filters
men .... " 36 I read this to mean that eternal return is a manner of
taking a stance toward the past, and thus toward oneself, which will
eliminate (" filter" ) those portions of a man and those men (the
schlecht-weggekommene- those whose " physiology" has become
characterized by nihilism) who manifest nihilism. As an analogy, and
only an analogy, I might suggest that eternal return would appear to
be a manner of dealing with oneself which would eliminate those
portions of one 's character which formed an ongoing neurosis. (I
repeat that this is, so far , only an analogy. Nietzsche's conception is
far more complicated, for his language is physiologicaL And, in any
case, it is difficult to understand what it means to get rid of eliminate - a portion of one "character.")
If this initial characterization of eternal return is accurate, we can
begin to understand why Nietzsche thinks his teaching is so significant. As seen above, Nietzsche holds that all previous teachings and
philosophical doctrines have merely confounded the error initiated
by the attitudes characterizing the historical Socrates. He writes
about his own activity in a manner entirely consonant with the
notion of " filtering" expressed above. " It has been my good fortune,
after thousands of years of error and confusion, to have recovered
the path that leads to a Yes and a No. I teach the No to all that
makes weak - which exhausts. I teach the Yes to all that makes for
strength - which stores up strength, which justifies [recbtfertigt] the
feeling of strength ." 37 It appears, then, that eternal return "filters,"
that it eliminates certain ways of being in the world (nihilism), and
that it consists of both a Yes and a No. This means that eternal
return is selective; only that which is not fLltered out by the "yes and
no" will return. Presumably, this would eliminate those things (those
memories, that portion of the past and its concretion in and as a
person) which are not lived "in eternal return." Eternal return will
not then be a sort of universal affirmation; such would not be
selective. For instance, the 1-A (}a-Yes) braying of the ass and the
higher men in the last book of Zarathustra can only be a caricature
of the life of eternal return to which the higher men are attempting
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to rise. 38 Universal affirmation is not selective, for it affirms everything unconditionally and thus remains in the service of nihilism. As
a beast of burden (like the camel), the ass carries all on its back. Its
"yes" contrasts with the child's dionysiac Yes which negates, because, as an assertion of a new creation, it destroys a previous
world. 39
It is important here to understand on what scale Nietzsche intends
his teaching. For two millennia, men have behaved in a slavely moral
manner. Nietzsche calls this the human-all-too-human, and investigates the ramifications in all aspects of human behavior. These
ramifications delineate a situation where men appear constitutionally
incapable of behaving any way except that in which they do. The
judgments about the world characteristic of slave morality hold man
a prisoner. Nietzsche interrogates himself on this problem: "But if
everything is necessary how can I control my affairs?" And he
immediately answers: "Thought and belief are of chief importance;
all other factors are in addition to this, which is greater than they.
You say that nourishment, place, air, society determine and change
you. Rather say, your judgments [Meinungen - which can have the
sense of legal opinions) do it even more, for these determine your
nourishment, place, air, society.
When you incarnate the thought
of thoughts, you will be transformed." 40 For "transformed, " Nietzsche uses the term verwandeln, which also carries the notions of
transubstantiation and metamorphosis; indeed the three Verwand/ungen of the spirit in the first chapter of Zarathustra are often translated as " metamorphoses." That Nietzsche uses the same word here
seems to indicate that he thinks the transformation effectuated by
eternal return is on the order of passing from one kind of "spirit" to
another.
In saying that eternal return is selective and transforming of the
person who is living by it, I assert that Nietzsche understands eternal
return to produce in human beings a transformation sufficiently deep
and general as to completely change the nature of all interactions
men have with themselves, with others, and with the world around
them. Men are transfigured. By the selective and filtering effect of
some activity, men can flush out some or all of what they have been.
Nietzsche's language, for instance, often draws on the digestive (he
accuses the Germans of "constipation "), and he is occasionally
preoccupied with questions of food and nourishment. The concern is
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probably more than metaphorical, for the imagery is appropriate. If
the human problem is the weight of the past on the present, then
men must learn how to carry and how to get rid of that which is a
block. In the imagery of the chapter "On the Vision and the Riddle,"
the dwarf must jump down off Zarathustra's back. To move from the
human-all-too-human to the overman (i.e., to that which is not
''human") means to get rid of and transform all the processes by
which men have related to tihe world over the last twenty-four
hundred years, in fact to transform men themselves. 41
As such, eternal return begins to look like Nietzsche's answer to
the "problem of metaphysics" which Kant poses at the beginning of
the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant argues there, as is
well known, that " human reason .
in one species of its knowledge ... is burdened by a question which, as prescribed by the very
nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as
transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer. " 42 As we
saw in Chapter III above, Nietzsche calls activity under this dilemma
nihilism, and extends the notion to the entire sphere of action of the
slavely moral man. If eternal return can do away with " the problem
of metaphysics," it will require at least a transformation in what men
mean by reasoning and thinking. In the light of eternal return , the
answers sought will be different sorts of answers to different questions; it could hardly be otherwise, for if men remain in the form of
discourse analyzed by Kant, they will necessarily eventually be led to
the dilemma he notes.
It is not surprising, then, that Nietzsche's thought has often been
grouped with "irrationalism." Most interpretations following this
vein do not have a very deep understanding of Nietzsche ; their
naivete, however, has kept them from fmding a reading of Nietzsche
so sophisticated as to avoid recognition of the fact that Nietzsche
really does want to abolish many of those forms of discourse which
we identify as the exercise of reason. This is not, of course, to say
that they have read Nietzsche correctly. Crane Brinton's book, which
falls in the "naive category," is much less a book than is Kaufmann's
Nietzsche. It fastens on the obvious, but does not know what to
make of it. Kaufmann, on the other hand, tends to disguise the
obvious in Nietzsche and not deal with it. Nietzsche does think that
the reasoning characteristic of metaphysics leads to nihilism and
should be "extirpated." He does not mean, as later positivists did,
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that man should simply turn away from that form of thinking. 43
The scope and import of his genealogical investigations is to assert
that all forms of activity are in the same slave "family." Hence, there
is no such thing as simply "giving up" metaphysics as pointless; one
can no more "give up" metaphysics than successfully deny one's
parentage. The problem is more general, to find a form of behavior
which is not subject to the dilemmas apparently inherent in the
present one.
Nietzsche knows that any new " non-metaphysical" world cannot
simply be just created. One must first learn to deal with and eradicate this one. Therefore men must understand - much more profoundly than ever before - the precise nature of this world. All of
Nietzsche's genealogical study is designed to show that moral valuations are the result of illustions, and that illusions are the necessary
and inevitable characteristics of particular action in the river of
existence. The important question is thus about that which underlies
and informs a particular set of actions, for Nietzsche is not so much
concerned to attack the validity of moral valuations as the soil in
which they are rooted. The true significance of Nietzsche's thought is
that it destroys not only by unmasking, but also through the provision of a new ontological setting. Nietzsche in a late fragment gives
eloquent summary to the need to define this new dynamic attitudinal basis. "All goals are annihilated. Men must give themselves
one. It was an error tO suppose that they should have one: they have
given them all to themselves. But the prerequisites for all earlier goals
are annihilated. Science shows the river, but not the goal. It does,
however, set the preconditions [ Voraussetzungen] to which the new
goal must respond." 44 Nietzsche, as we shall see, sees his task to be
the establishment of new preconditions which will make the new
goal possible.

The Question of Breeding

The contention that Nietzsche is trying to reground the manner in
which men relate to each other, and to the world , forces us to go
further, into territory which recent work on Nietzsche has generally
avoided. Nietzsche is not (just) talking about a manner of thinking;
since he thinks that men have been changed in their nature by slave
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morality, they will also have to be changed if they are to become
overmen. It is the most " natural " thing in the world to be slavely
moral; indeed, there appears to be nothing else. It will have to appear
equally " natural" to be an overman. Hence, I am forced to take very
seriously all those bothersome statements which most modern scholars of Nietzsche have simply left out of their analysis in a well-meant
reaction to the distortions of the Nazis. The talk about " breeding"
and " race" is important in Nietzsche's thought, and it simply won 't
do to pile up the quotations whkh say nice things about the jews
and nasty ones about the Germans. Nietzsche is talking about developing men who are not subject to the "human-all-too-human." He
repeatedly uses the word ziicbten, which me~ to breed, raise, rear,
grow or cultivate, a word normally used in connection with animals
or plants. After leaving Basel, he conspicuously stops using erzieben,
which has connotations of "bring up" and "educate."
These remarks permit a considerable modification of the usual
opinion that Nietzsche was some sort of Lamarckian. He is saying
that the effect of constantly repeating an action (of its being "in
eternal return ") can produce a change in the indiv1dual which is only
" psychological," not just "second nature" or habit, bur rather
eventually becomes one's " real" nature, and in so doing expels the
"nature" that was present before. In a passage I have had opportunity to cite before, but which now presents itself for the first time
in a clear light, Nietzsche writes:
... As we are merely the resultant of previous generations, we are also the
resultant of their errors, passions, and mistakes, indeed of their cnmes. It is not
possible to completely free oneself from this chain. Though we condemn the
errors and hold ourselves to be free of them, we have not Laid aside the fact that
we sprin.g from them . ... We arrive at best at a conflict between our innate,
inherited nature and our knowledge, as well as a struggle of a new strong growth
against that which has been from the past cultivated and inherited; we plant a
new form of life, a new instinct, a second nature which withers the first. It is an
attempt to give oneself a posteriori a past from which one might have sprung, as
against that from which one does spring- always a dangerous attempt, because
it is so difficult to find a Limit to the denial of the past, and because the second
nature is generally weaker than the first. We stop too often at knowing the good
without doing it, because we also know the better but cannot do it. But here and
there the victory is achieved and a special conciliation attained by the combatants ... : to know that this fli'St nature - it, too - was once a second nature
and that every conquering second nature becomes a first.45
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Already in this early essay Nietzsche takes up the concerns that
remain central to the rest of his activity. In the past, men have
changed radically: a number of forms of life have been possible,
different from each other even in their most fundamental traits. Men
appear to have no way to consciously free themselves from what
they have been. Yet, it appears now that they must, for the triumph
of slave morality has become well-nigh total. Nietzsche's task is to
find a doctrine that replaces nihilism, now man's "first nature," with
another "first nature," and to transfigure the " human" into the
"over-human."
These considerations allow me to express my variance with the
subtle and seductive interpretation of Martin Heidegger and the
related one of Gilles Deleuze. The understanding of Heidegger is
complex and complicated: complex, because his thought uses many
terms which do not always carry an assured philosophical resonance;
complicated, because it is a hallmark of Heideggerian interpretation
that one should not necessarily be able to clearly separate the
interpreter from the interpreted. For Heidegger, the philosophical
meaning of a piece of criticism and interpretation must emerge out
of the interaction of the writer and his subject - it cannot be
stated. 46
l once had some sympathies for this approach; much less now; in
any case, this is not the place to elaborate on it. 47 However, it seems
to me that in the case of his understanding of Nietzsche, Heidegger
makes several important mistakes that keep him from recognizing
what Nietzsche is saying to him. His interpretation 48 seems to
contain the following points. (1) The experience of truth can be
other than historical (i.e., one can "escape" metaphysics by " understanding" the Grund of Sein, p. 257). (2) The will to power culminates in eternal return (p. 10) which is still historical and metaphysical in kind (p. 9). (3) Nietzsche's thought, even though the "last
stage of metaphysics," is still metaphysical in character, and is a
metaphysics of pure subjectivity (p. 199). It would then follow that
Heidegger must logically conclude that for Nietzsche there can be no
change in basic ontology (no historical ontological relativity, cf.
p. 259). He is thus led logically to conclude, for instance, that
Nietzsche's "racial" thinking must be metaphysical and not biological in nature (p. 309).
I have noted in the previous chapter some important errors in
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Heidegger's reading. I find no reason here to set out a full exposition
of the differences between my understanding and his. That we share
some points of understanding should also be apparent. For instance,
Heidegger finds, as I do, that eternal rerum is not Heraclitean and
cannot be a cyclical concept (pp. 11-12). However, the fact that he
leaves Nietzsche fully in, if as the culmination of, the pbilosopbia
perennis 49 means that I must reject his overall understanding. Put
bluntly: by trying to reserve for himself the so-called honor of being
the first man to "escape" metaphysics, Heidegger is forced to ignore
the fact that Nietzsche fully believed that his doctrine would make
men really different - not human-all-too-human. Nietzsche's doctrine does admit of a coherent exposition, in Nietzsche's terms, as I
have attempted to show. This understanding does, however, imply
that distinctions between the biological and the "metaphysical," or
more properly, the philosophical, such as Heidegger would have
Nietzsche make, are, in fact, not made by Nietzsche. In no way could
Heidegger's Nietzsche permit the extreme and radical rejection of the
mind-body dualism which Nietzsche seems in fact to have made.
Gilles Deleuze' interpretation 50 I find even more brilliant than
Heidegger's. He emphasizes strongly (if somewhat in Ia maniere des
grandes ecoles) the noncyclical nature of eternal return and attempts
to relate it to other aspects of Nietzsche's thought (in particular the
views on nihilism). He, however, shares with Heidegger the notion
that the will to power has something directly to do with eternal
rerum. He and Heidegger seem to see the will to power as pbysis, the
dynamic force leading to eternal return. As far as can be determined,
there is no direct textual evidence for this. As we have seen, Nietzsche never calls the will to power physis, but rather sees it as pathos,
as a sequence of states of affairs. The will to power seems to be the
principle of a life; eternal rerum, however, is a doctrine. Almost
never does Nietzsche speak of them in the same text, nor does he
address them to the same audience. But Deleuze is led to affirm that
eternal return produces a certain kind of orientation toward the
world. He feels that, when coupled with the highest stage of nihilism,
eternal return produces an "active" state of existence by a sort of
"negation of the negation." 51
My analysis tends to indicate that it works the other way around:
a certain form of orientation produces eternal return. This raises far
more difficult problems for putting the doctrine into practice. If the

THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL RETURN

(

277

process contains no inward logic which makes it happen in and of
itself, how is one to arrive at the state of eternal return ? Why will
men not simply continue to act in the repetition of their present
mode of acting; Nietzsche identifies in The Antichrist some " families, tribes, or £eoples" who have fortunately and accidentally managed this feat. 2 Among them is, obviously, Greece. The problem for
contemporary times, however, is so great and the onslaught of
nihilism and decadence so overwhelming that man can no longer
depend on accidents and lucky hits. Now, and in opposition to the
Greeks, man must " make real by plan what happened before by
accident." 53 This makes the task much more difficult and Nietzsche
queries of those men who must do this: " How can such a man think
of eternal return?" 54

Signs of Eternal Return:
The Failures of the Higher Men
I said above that eternal return is selective, that it allows us to
eradicate the history which leads to present " nature " and which
pushes us toward nihilism and, finally, that eternal return cannot
operate unless one deals with the world in a certain way. The last
contention is probably key ; until now, I have had to leave it abstract
and have only been able to note that the shepherd appears "transfigured, " or that Zarathustra still fails to be able to summon eternal
return. I turn here, then, to a consideration of exactly what it means
to stand in eternal return. What is it that men must, as Nietzsche
significantly says, " learn, practice, and translate into flesh and reality, and even into the commonplace." 55 What sort of beings must we
be to experience ourselves and the world in a manner made new by
the doctrine of eternal return?
In Book Four of Zttrathustra, we meet examples of men who,
despite their efforts, have been unable to live in eternal return. They
are the "higher men," examples of the highest types humanity has
yet evolved, and all wou1d-be followers of Zarathustra. Notwithstanding all their discipleship, or perhaps because of it, these men are
not on the path to Obermenschlichkeit. 56 Zarathustra tells them:
"When you reach your goal, when you jump off your horse - on
your very height, you higher men, you will stumble. " 57 The failings
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in these men are such that they will never be able to become
overmen, for their will to power maintains them ineluctably in the
world of the human.
Nietzsche gives a fairly specific account of these failings, which
serves as a happy focal point for an investigation of those traits one
would have to have to live in eternal return. The higher men themselves have an inkling of their failures. Nietzsche notes that they feel
a need for a constant and unselective affirmation, a yea-saying to
everything. They celebrate this in their worship of the ass, "the
animal," Zarathustra remarks, " with long ears who only says Yes and
never says No. Has he not created the world in his own image,
namely as stupid as possible?" 58 The ass is to be contrasted to those
creatures who have small, discriminating ears, such as Ariadne, into
whose ear Dionysos can whisper the secret of eternal return. 59 The
path to eternal return, it appears, is labyrinthian and never direct. It
is only available to those who are able to deny as well as affirm. If
one tries to say "yes" to everything, as do the higher men, one lacks
certain abilities, which Nietzsche seems to hold as central to and
descriptive of the world of eternal return. These are spelled out in
the chapter "On the Higher Man" as the ability to play and gamble
(spielen), the ability to laugh, and the ability to dance. 60 These are
abilities that appear to make it possible to begin the process of
learning, practicing, internalization, and transformation which is
characteristic of eternal return. Unless one can do these, nothing else
is possible.
All of these abilities involve particular attitudes toward the world
and a particular way of dealing with oneself, with others, and with
the environment. Nietzsche selects them as exemplary of the failures
of the higher men because, I believe, they portray a mode of
existence different from the " normal," yet generally available to the
reader who has experienced them and is able to understand the
importance of his or her experience.
Play,, the first of these activities, is a form of behavior in which a
goal is of little or no importance. The German spielen carries with it
denotations even more extensive than those accompanying the English " play." Not only does it signify " playing" and " play-acting,"
but it is also used where an English speaker would say "gambling. "
With this activity, NietzSche wants to bring back an attitude he had
found central to Heraclitus. What Heraclitus saw, " the teaching of
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the law in becoming and play in necessity must be seen from now on
in all eternity. He raised the curtain on this greatest of all possible
dramas." 61 For Heraclitus, the world was the gaming table of the
divine world-child. It is the affirmation of the accidental necessities
of such gaming that attracts Nietzsche. He writes in Zarathustra: "If
I ever played dice with gods at gods' tables .. . - for the earth is a
table for the gods and trembles with creative new words and godthrows: Oh, bow should I not lust after eternity.... " 62 Gaming
combines in one activity the result created by the throw, the accident of that result, and the necessity of the conditions that make the
throw possible.
Playing is sufficiently important to Nietzsche that he makes it the
characteristic of the self-affirming child who is the fmal metamorphosis of the spirit in the beginning of Zarathustra. 63 What
attracts Nietzsche, I believe, is the fact that games and gaming are
only made possible by necessities, yet, while playing, one does not
experience the necessities as constraint. They are rather the condition of freedom which makes the game possible. For instance, one
simply would not know what to say to a chess player who (seriously)
claimed to be oppressed by the rule that "bishops move on the
diagonals." This and other necessities make chess possible. Nietzsche
selects dice as an example because while there is the experience of
chance as to what comes up, one would not want to claim at the
same time that there was not a necessity to the throw.
.ln play, then, one's behavior is an affirmation of those rules
which, in their necessity, make possible that one plays. Nietzsche
claims, for instance, that Zarathustra's kingdom is that of chance, 64
an affirmation of that which happens to be Zarathustra. It is as if in
dice one were what one plays, and, if one plays oneself correctly
there can be no cause for recrimination, either at the external world
(which is "bad conscience") or at oneself (ressentiment). The higher
men refuse to affirm what they play and seek a reason for failure , or
feel ashamed. Nietzsche writes: "Shy, ashamed, like a tiger whose
leap has failed: thus I have often seen you slink aside, you higher
men. A throw failed you. But you dice-throwers, what does it
matter? You have not learned to gamble and jest as one must gamble
and jest. Do we not always sit at a big gambling table and jesting
table? And, if something great has failed you, does it follow that you
yourselves are failures, does it follow that man himself is a fail-
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ure?" 65 Though they appear to play, the higher men do not know
how; the game remains a means for them in their misbegotten
attempt to attain Ubermenscblicbk.eit.
The higher men do not realize that since they fail in their throw, it
does folJow that man is a failure. Instead of looking for reasons,
Nietzsche thinks then that they should accept that they are also
scblecbt-weggekommene and wish to perish. " I love him," writes
Nietzsche, " who is abashed when the dice fall to make h is fortune
and asks, ' Am I then a crooked gambler rJalscber Spieler]?' For he
wants to perish." 66 Instead of going under, the higher men seek to
stay alive ; they are evil, slavely moral players who seek to trap the
dice in a web of probability and to profit from an infmite series of
chances. This is a very different attitude from that which accepts
that one wins because one has the right to win. The other stance is
amor fati, 67 the love of necessity, which recognizes that perhaps one
is entitled only to go under. The acceptance of oneself in eternity
may require that one perish; above all, Nietzsche says, don't wait for
your chance. Statistics are not the path of eternal return.
ln Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche can then refer to a fin al stage
which closes out morality, the ausser-moraliscb, in which matters will
not be judged by their effects, nor their intentions, but rather when
" the decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is unintentional
to it." 68 In such a situation , character would once again be destiny,
much as it had been fo r Aeschylus. In games, too, the intentions of
the players (as long as they are playing the game) are of little
importance. For instance, excuses and the attendant concept of
responsibility do not often occur in a game. Should one kick the ball
over the goal in soccer, the plea that " I did not intend to" is not
really appropriate; on the other hand, the notion of fault is equally
out of place. The game is then a capsule summary for Nietzsche of a
life beyond good and evil, beyond utility and the moral antinomies
which " normalJy" shape existence. In a game, properly played, one
truly " wills one's own will." 69
Situations such as gaming imply a perfect union between obligation and desire, between what one h as to do (play this game) and
what one wants to do (play the game). This resembles what Kant
thought would be the case with a being both perfectly rational and
perfectly moral. Kant, characteristically, found such a life to be
impossible; Nietzsche hopes to make one possible. For both men ,
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however, the perfect unity characterizing such a being is one that
knows no moral problems, that eliminates choice between moral
alternatives. The world cannot present (moral) problems, when whatever one might and can do is appropriate. 70 In such cases, one is
reminded, as Nietzsche writes in The Gay Science, "of the improvising masters of the musical art, to whom even the listeners would fain
ascribe a divine infallibility of the hand, notwithstanding that they
now and then make a mistake as every mortal is liable to do. But
they are skilled and inventive, and always ready in a moment to
arrange into the structure of the score the most accidental tone ....
And animate the accident with a fine meaning and soul." 71
Laughter is the second attitude that leads to eternal return and
that the higher men lack. We can appreciate here the leap that has
occurred since the world of the Iliad. There Achilles accuses Apollo
of gaming with him and is furious over it. 72 Nietzsche would have
had him laugh. Such laughter, though, was not possible in the shame
culture of Homeric Greece. Achilles had been shamed by Apollo and
had no means to deal with it, for laughter implies a nobility that
transcends the bounds of the heroic.
From The Birth of Tragedy to the problems of the higher men,
Nietzsche sows his work with affirmations of the necessity of laughter. At the moment of transfiguration which leads to eternal return,
the shepherd laughs "not like a man. " Man must "learn to laugh," 73
Nietzsche constantly asserts. And laughter will be a characteristic of
the transfigured man ; a sign of the final approach of eternal return to
Zarathustra is the "laughing lion." 74 For Nietzsche, not to laugh is
in the end to revere; 75 to revere is to take as permanently deserving
of reverence that which is at best transitory. Nietzsche reproaches
the higher men for their seriousness: " ... learn to laugh at yourselves
as one must laugh! You higher men, bow much is still possible." 76
The higher men do attempt to laugh. The magician's Nur Narr! Nur
Dichter! is a poetically successful though ontologically clumsy attempt at self-mockery, which immediately follows Zarathustra's
command to laugh. It is possible to fail in laughter - to laugh in the
wrong manner- just as it is possible to game wrongly.
Laughter is not, however, the simple denial of the present situation. It is, if done properly, the sign of a different consciousness, of
an existence grounded on some other basis than that which is being
laughed at. Thus, the higher men must learn to laugh at themselves.
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Laughter is the means by which me suffering in the world is transformed into joy. Zarathustra must "laugh angrily" at himself before
he realizes that he has overcome me last obstacle to eternal return :
pity.
If laughter transforms suffering and nausea into joy, it is also
symbolic of the affirmation of thiis joy. Laughter is will to power in
that the same basic impulse takes en a plurality of forms on a
plurality of occasions. Each Laugher affirms a particular instance,
but in so doing affirms the power of laughter and ontological height
of the Iaugher. Laughter, as an overcoming of pity , is the means by
which the whole question of the past is transformed. It allows men
to forget that the whole question of guilt was ever asked. Without
the past, there can be no guilt, for guilt implies the existence of the
past independent of the actor. Laughter is a sign that the past is
willed and is thus contained in the willing individual; it therefore
returns as he acts. As in tragedy, this means that the Iaugher is by
his existence affirming the responsibility for his acts. Laughter gives
men an existence that does not ask the questions of transcendent
guilt.
Upon the overcoming of the nauseating version of eternal return,
the shepherd is transformed, laughs, and breaks into dance. The
inability to dance is the third failure of the higher men, for the dance
is the symbol of the joyful wisdom: it is that which can only be
expressed in activity, but which nevertheless comes welling up out of
a conscious innocence. n
Some examination of dance as an activity makes clear what
NietzSche was getting at and further fills in the characteristics of
eternal return. "Only in the dance," Nietzsche writes, "do I know
how to speak the image of the highest things. " 78 For Nietzsche, to
dance is to signify triumph over the spirit of gravity and over the
spirit of ressentiment. 79 What seems important to Nietzsche is that
dance is a learned activity in the sense that one learns to do all the
steps making up a dance, but that, even though learned, it is not
thereby reflective. Once one has learned how to do a tour jete, one
can do it without a feeling of difficulty or compulsion - almost, I
might say, "naturally." As a whole a dance is a plurality, or, as
Nietzsche notes in a more exalted language during the time he was
figuring these ideas out for the writing of Zarathustra, it is the
"impression upon becoming of the character of being." 80 As with
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music or a language, a dance is a process, learned, yet nonetheless

natural, which appears as a whole.
In dance, then, the dancer manifests in a conscious fashion that

which is an acquired instinct. The dance is "learned, practiced,
translated into flesh and reality and even into common sense." It is
not that Nietzsche wants people to punctuate their walks with
occasional entre-chats (though we do speak approvingly of ''jumping
for joy"); he rather chooses dance as a sign of the failure of the
higher men to learn a new and complicated form of activity so well
that they feel no compulsion, and can do it "naturally." As T. S.
Eliot put it some twenty-five years later from a somewhat more
Anglican vein:
The inner freedom from practical desire,
The release from action and suffering, release from the inner
And the outer compulsion, yet surrounded
By a grace of sense . . . . 8 1

These reflections incidentally enforce a further modification in the
normal interpretation that Nietzsche is some sort of Lamarckian and
believes in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. There certainly
is a manner in which Nietzsche wants to say that the more one
practices new forms of activity, the more natural and commonplace
the artificially acquired traits become. 82 It is not really important to
settle the problem as to whether or not they can be genetically
inherited. As is often the case, there is some truth in the designation
(here as Lamarckian) given Nietzsche; as usual, the understanding
misses its mark.

Eternal Return: A Simple Case
These concepts - playing, laughing, dancing - are highly metaphorical and condensed in resonance. It must be understood, though,
that while Nietzsche intends them as metaphors and wishes the
reader to be carried back and forth between two worlds, one of
which may be familiar, the other rich and strange, he also intends
them as descriptive of a particular orientation toward the world. It
should therefore be possible to give a description of a person in this
state, a state of eternal return. Before moving to Nietzsche's discus-
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sion of the historical and social consequences of eternal return, I will
essay a description which ties these notions together in an available
manner.
In doing so, I must immediately enter a caveat. The example of
eternal return that follows is as simple as it can be. It is an example
of only a limited activity, not a whole life,.where behavior is like that
which Nietzsche describes as subject to eternal return. There is the
danger that the reader assume that this is "all" that eternal return
means. I shall attempt to dissuade the reader from this position as I
go along, but my experience has often been that this made no
difference.
Since eternal return involves the return of specific forms of life, it
cannot be investigated in general. An understanding, though, may be
gained from the description of a particular activity. I pick here
skiing. In doing so I recognize two things. ln the first place, skiing is
obviously a limited portion of a human life. It does not imply the
sort of complete transformation that Nietzsche was trying to bring
about. It does, however, seem to me probable that Nietzsche accepts
the possibility of eternal return for a particular portion of a person 's
life, as long as, during the time the person is engaged in that activity,
the activity can or does encompass all of the person's attention. Such
is true of skiing, as it is of many other activities. 83 Secondly, it is
probable that this discussion will be fully meaningful only to the
degree that the reader skis, or is able to substitute a similar activity
of his own. Nietzsche notes that "one only understands these things
theoretically when they have been achieved in practice." 84 Unless
the reader has experienced the sense of freedom and power and the
Lack of constraint attained when skiing well, or when in more
complicated situations, such as playing in a string quartet or making
love, the following description may remain in part a mystery.
In skiing, one affirms skills that one has acquired. However, the
affirmation of these skills is not reflexive: one does not have to think
to do a parallel christiania. In fact , to the degree that my parallels are
still reflexive, the chances of their execution are diminished. Furthermore, the easier my turns come, the more difficult can be the slope I
undertake (and the more likely I will be to undertake them.) If a fall,
in this case, it will be because I have made a mistake; that is, I have
undertaken something I should not have, or need not have. ss ln this
case, however, it is wrong to say, :as slave-skiing-morality would have
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it, either that "something tripped me up," that is, that something
inevitable happened, or that I did something not really my fault, for
example, "caught an edge." Both of these explanations are possible,
but they are not about skiing; they remove the process of skiing from
me and ascribe my problems to an outside agency. There is a way in
which it makes sense to say that a really good skier gets down
anything that is a ski slope. In a happier subcase of having made a
mistake, I may also fall, in that I tried to do something I am not
capable of. Ln this case, I may eventually come to master the slope; if
I cannot, I should be content with that, or perhaps realize that skiing
is not what I am cut out for. "My teaching says," writes Nietzsche,
" live such that you must wish to so live again .... To whom striving
gives the highest feeling [Gefohl] , let him strive; to whom peace
gives the highest feeling, let him be peaceful; to whom ordering,
following, obedience give the highest feeling, let him obey. May he
only become conscious about that which gives him the highest
feeling, and not balk at any means. It is a matter of eternity . ... " 86
When I ski, that portion of me which lets me ski "naturally,"
without reflection, is constantly being actualized. Yet my ability to
ski, now so "natural," is an acquired characteristic, which I am no
more capable of forgetting than I am capable of not knowing how to
ride a bicycle. In my skiing, I have, then, solved the problem that
Nietzsche sets as entirely new, "just dawning on the human eye and
hardly yet recognizable: to embody knowledge within ourselves and
make it instinctive." 87 In a note from the period of Morgenrote,
Nietzsche seems even to indicate that the change is neurophysiological: "AU which has been organized in the nerves lives on in
them." (Biochemically, this is, of course, pure hypothesis and speculation. It may not be entirely without reality, however. See note 45
above.)
When I have thus learned to ski, in a certain manner I have also
conquered time. That portio n of my life which was not-skiing and

wanting-to-ski no longer affects me and has been completely eradicated. I am not capable of returning to that form of existence; my
skiing ability is now always with me, and will appear whenever I ski.
So Wagner was to "make art become natural. " 88 As Nietzsche
writes, my " new life ... has slain [my previous life) ; (I) do not
require it anymore, and now it breaks down of its own accord." 89
For Nietzsche, if an activity of a life is in eternal return, all that

286 )

THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL R£TURN

might affect this activity or life adversely is destroyed. For instance,
when I have learned how to ride a bicycle (or to ski), to go again to
the situation of not being able to ride a bicycle will probably require
more effort than the acquisition of the ability to ride, and may be
impossible. It is, I believe, the situation of having learned how to ride
a bicycle and no longer being the sort of person who cannot ride a
bicycle, which Nietzsche characterizes in Morgenrote as "conscious
innocence. "
Finally, what one has learned and incarnated in becoming a
person-who-can-ski will be manifest in the entire activity for which it
is appropriate. As Zarathustra notes: "That which you called world,
that must be created first by you : it must itself become your reason,
your picture [Bild] , your will, your love." 90 And thus one will call
this situation good. " Each fundamental character trait that lies at the
bottom of every occurrence and finds expression in every occurrence
must, if recognized by the individual as his fundamental character
trait, drive every individual to triumphantly call each instance of the
whole existence [des allgemeinen Daseins] good. It would in fact
come down to this: one happily feels this fundamental character trait
in oneself as good and worthwhile, with pleasure. " 91 Many of our
common expressions carry out the image that Nietzsche conveys
here. We say easily, " I was skiing way above my head - that's why I
fell." Here we are much like those who wesh to go under, for even if
we don't fall when skiing " above our head," we know that we are
not entitled to that run. In fact, we often feel , I think, a frisson of
childish pleasure at having gotten away with something. Nietzsche
would deny us this by the above citation: we must know that what
we are and do shall pervade every part of our activity.
In skiing-eternal return , then, a learned process is constantly and
unreflexively manifesting itself in the particular present that is skiing.
It is not surprising that Nietzsche notes that there have been hornologues to eternal return in the past. Indeed, there are several occasions
in history when the immediate life of a man was colored by the
constant pressure of a particular dominant notion. For instance, the
" prospect of damnation" played such a role in making men examine
their acts in terms of something other than the moment. 92 The
possibility of eternal damnation is, for Nietzsche, a thought similar
to eternal return. That it was a false thought and did not liberate
men from their past, is, of course, true. But the effect of this
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erroneous thought is, in Nietzsche 's eyes, still staggering. "Let us
examine," he writes, "how the thought that something recurs [sich
etwas wiederholt] has worked until now (the year, for example, or
periodic illness, waking and sleeping, etc . . .. ). Even when the coming back again is only a possibility it can stagger and reform
us . .. . " 93 It is worth noting here that Nietzsche contrasts his position with this one ; for him, living in eternal return is not to function
as a simple " possibility," but only as a reality. Nor is his position the
folie circulaire referred to in Ecce Homo. 94 Nietzsche is talking of a
life informed by entirely new tones, different in kind from the old
ones. I should think it a change, on a vast scale, analogous perhaps to
that one feels the first time one knows one is able to ride a bicycle or
do a parallel christiania, but whereafter there is, so to speak, a
different era. As Nietzsche writes: " From the moment on, when this
thought is there, all colors are changed and there is a new history. " 95
Eternal Return and the Times to Come

I have picked a very limited example of an activity that can occur in
something like what Nietzsche means by eternal return. In skiing, or
riding a bicycle, or indeed, in playing in a string quartet or making
love, though these last two examples involve other people and are
thus more complicated, one learns to do a very complicated set of
actions perfectly well, such that these actions come into play whenever it is appropriate for them to. Once the activity is fully made part
of a person, he or she is incapable of not being that sort of person. I,
for instance, am incapable of not being able to ride a bicycle;
whenever I am on a bicycle, the ability to ride naturally comes back
and manifests itself. It is true, of course, that riding a bicycle or
skiing occupy only a portion of my life. If, however, it should be my
whole life, or, as Nietzsche says, my " highest feeling," then everything I did would stand in eternal return and in the joy that comes in
feeling no discontinuity between myself and the world in which I
act. (Think here of what it is like to ski well, or play an instrument
well.)
I realize that my focus on examples such as skiing may prove
misleading: as skills, they do not apparently involve a transformation
of the whole person. Nietzsche, however, certainly thinks the doc-
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trine of eternal return to have consequences beyond those in a
portion of an individual. He writes in a late note: "The coming
history : this thought will always conquer more - and those who do
not believe in it must eventually,. due to their nature [ih rer Natur
nach 1, die out. Only he who hold:s his existence [Dasein 1 capable of
eternal return will remain [b/eibt iibrig1; among such, however,
conditions such as no utopian yet has imagined are possible." 96
Eternal return then will provide a doctrine that . can eventually
inform all existence, much in the way that Socratic Christianity
dominates at present. Though Nietzsche gives very little extended
discussion of what he has in mind, it is possible to say a bit about the
new transvaluation of values.
For the last twenty-four hundred years, Nietzsche says, men have
incarnated an error. 97 They have persuaded themselves of the
" truth" of the self-desrructive illusions of slave morality and have
lived them out. We saw in previous chapters how the logic of the
genealogy of slave morality leads men inexorably to the vicious circle
of nihilism. One might say that the last (slavely moral) men are their
own fetishes, their own prisoners in their own errors.
To break out from the prison of our present being is both difficult
and dangerous. Nietzsche speaks often of the attractions that his
doctrine will have for men and is afraid that men will seize upon it as
justification for behavior to which they are not entitled. " Are you
prepared?" he demands in a late note. " You must have lived through
every degree of skepticism and have desiringly bathed in ice-cold
streams - otherwise you have no right to thi.s thought. I must defend
myself against the easy-to-believe and the enthusiasts." 98 Nietzsche's
notes from this period are filled both with his conviction that his
doctrine should be spread throughout the world and with his fear of
the danger that mankind will not be sufficiently prepared to be able
to incorporate the new teaching.
His reason is cautiousness: the soil must be prepared. Success for
the doctrine of eternal return, such that it becomes " a great tree,
which overshadows all of coming humanity," 99 will require careful
husbandry over a long period. Whereas, in the past, some men and
peoples may have lived as overmen, they attained it through lucky
and only partially successful circumstances, which Nietzsche does
not think sufficient for the .future. He writes that "success in individual cases is constantly encountered in the most widely different
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places and cultures: here we really do find a higher type which, in
relation to mankind as a whole, is a kind of overman. Such fortunate
accidents of great success were always possible and will perhaps
always be possible. And even entire families, tribes, peoples can
occasionally represent such a bull 's-eye. " 100 The Greeks were such a
success. For the future , however, we can no longer rely on accidents ;
instead, and this is the source of Nietzsche's concern with "breeding"
and " extirpation," the overman must be "bred , willed, and attained"
through the doctrine of eternal return. 101
Conditions must be created such that the doctrine can "sink in
slowly," 102 failing which there will be " thirty years Gloria, with
drums and fifes, and then thirty years of grave-digging." 103 It is
true, Nietzsche writes, that the democratization of civilization, which
he spends so much rime diagnosing in On the Genealogy of Morals
and The Antichrist, makes it possible for the overman to "maintain
and develop himself the most easily." 104 But overmen can only exist
initially in conjunction with a philosophical ruling class 105 addressing itself to the central political task, without which nothing else will
be possible. "The question and at the same time the task is approaching with hesitation, as terrible as fare , bur nevertheless inevitable."
Nietzsche warns: " How shall the earth as a whole be ruled? And to
what end shall man as a whole - no longer as a people or a race - be
reared and trained? " 106
The task of the preparation for the doctrine of eternal rerum is of
central concern to Nietzsche. In a note from 1885, he writes : " Basic
idea: the new values must first be created - we shall not be spared
that! The philosopher must be a lawgiver to us. New types. (As
earlier the highest types (e.g. , Greeks) were bred: this type of
'accident' to be willed consciously.)" 107 We seem to be in a situation where nothing holds mankind back: there is a danger of a total
chaos, in which any and all voices will speak, and none be heard.
Nietzsche is then concerned that the earth be prepared for his
doctrine , so that he 'be not misinterpreted. Much as for Zarathustra,
Nietzsche's initial problem is to develop an audience able to hear
what he says.
To this extent, Nietzsche occasionally refers to the " lords of the
earth," who seem to be a dominating and legislative class, and whose
role it is to create the conditions that will make meaningful discourse
and life possible again on the earth . The " lords of the earth " will
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have to discover "a whole host of transitory and deceptive measures ... to this end : slowly and cautiously to liberate ... a whole
host of slandered instincts .... " 108 There is no doubt that Nietzsche
thinks that the function of this political class will be to reshape what
it means to be human.
From now on, there will be more favorable conditions for more comprehensive
forms of domination, whose like has never yet existed. And this is not even the
most important thing; it is rather the development of the possibility of international species-unions [ Gescblecbts- Verb,inden] which will set themselves the
task of rearing a new master race [Herreti-Rasse], the future " lords of the
earth";- a vast new aristocracy, based on the most severe self-legislation, in
which the will of the philosophical men of power and the artist-tyrants wiU be
given permanence [Dauer] over millennia;- a higher kind of men who . .. will
work on "men" themselves as artists. Enough, the time comes, in which one will
have to change all one knows about politic.s. 109

To bring about this new transfigured world, and put into practice
the doctrine of eternal return , will require a change in "all one knows
about politics." By this Nietzsche seems to mean that in the past,
politics was, as was the case in Greece, an often fearful agon of
equals inside an unquestioned arena. Men fought and competed for
advantage and superiority. They did not, however, fight to define
what would make a man superior or give him advantage. In previous
politics, Nietzsche is saying, men fought and cooperated to gain more
of what there was to get; it is, however, presumed that men knew
what they were fighting about. The breakdown of the common
world, which Nietzsche sees as a necessary characteristic of modern
times, 110 means that men increasingly have no idea of what counts
to be fought for. Hence , the new idea of politics must be war to say
what will count, what the standards by which men will measure
themselves shall be . This is politics to define the world, not to gain
control of a portion of it. (On a far lesser scale, since both the United
States and the Soviet Union emerge from a common tradition,
Nietzsche would think that there is a right track in the naive belief
that "we are fighting with the communists - or capitalists - to see
who wiJJ run the world.")
If nihilism was a form of behavior in which one could never rest
content with a conclusion, where, as Wittgenstein said, one could not
stop philosophizing, the modern world is for Nietzsche a world in
which one cannot possibly be content. The will to create a world
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where on would be, and know, who one is, leads Nietzsche, as it does

Max Weber, to occasionally express admiration for the caste system
of India. However, he thinks it to be so simplistic a system as to be
unworkable ("a school for stupefaction," in which is lacking " nature,
technology, history, art, science ... " 111 ). The world which must be
made for Europeans and eventually for all men ("mankind wants to
become one") must take its own past into account. The eradication
of the forms of behavior which men have inherited from Socrates
and Christ and which form the basis of Western nihilism does for
Nietzsche, require the eradication of what we have meant by the
moral point of view. Nietzsche finds that at this time in history, the
conjoining of morality and war (the "war of spirits" above) is not
only dangerous, but leads nowhere except to insanity. As Stanley
Cavell has remarked: "Someday, if there is a someday, we will have
to learn that evil thinks of itself as good, that it could not have made
such progress in the world unless people planned and performed it in
all conscience." 112 One must only add to this that when men lose
the ability to call anything good or evil, then all must appear, as it
does to the higher men, worthy of affirmation.
To the nihilism of universal affirmation, a world taught by the
doctrine of eternal return provides an alternative, not a necessary or
likely one, nor an immediately available position, but only an alternative. Nietzsche hopes that men will begin to think of life as "an
experiment of the thinker - and not as a duty, not a fatality , not a
deceit." 113 In such a tentative, the whole science of ethics which
evolves from Socrates and which Nietzsche characterizes as "knowledge in service to life" will become simply unnecessary. Such men
will not need knowledge to shore up their life ; rather, for them, "life
is a means to knowledge." They will uncover, or recover themselves,
and, as in a game, not have to ask "What should I do?" as a moral
question.
Nietzsche, in fact, thinks that his own life has proceeded along
such lines. Only that which the language of his life has made
knowledge, exists and survives. The rest, the mistakes and the past
which might otherwise weigh upon his life, is no more. On his
birthday in 1888 he writes a passage to this effect, which stands as
epigraph to his autobiography, Ecce Homo : "On this perfect day,
when everything ripens and not only the grape becomes brown, the
eye of the sun just fell on my life ; I saw backward, I looked forward ,
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I never saw so many and so good things at once. It was not in vain
that I buried my forty-fourth year today, I had the right to bury it;
what was life in it is saved, is immortal. ... How could I fail to be
grateful to my whole life? And so I tell my life to myself." 114
This is a life beyond good and evil, which has no need of moral
problems, where one does what one is, means what one says, where
character is destiny. But this is not a claim by Nietzsche that anyone
can do anything one wants to, or that morality is simply pablum for
the weak. Men who live in eternal return are entitled to live beyond
morality . Not anyone can at any time do this, however : one cannot
claim to live beyond morality just because one wants to. The transfiguration required is slow and difficult and requires much effort. 115

Nietzsche's Political Predicament

In the Republic, Plato writes of a man who has attained the blessings
of philosophy. Such a man, remarks Plato, may be compared to " a
man who has fallen in among wild beasts - he will not join the
wickedness of his fellows , but neither is he. able to singly resist all
their fierce natures, ... and therefore he goes his own way, ... and
will have done a great work before he departs; . . . but not the
greatest, unless he finds a state which is suitable for him ; for in a
state suitable for him, he will have a larger growth and be the savior
of his country as well as of himself." 116 At the end of his life in
sanity, Nietzsche writes to his old friend and mentor Jacob Burckhardt that he is having the top leadership of Germany done away
with ; a few days earlier, he had written August Strindberg that he has
ordered "a convocation of princes in Rome" and means " to have the
young emperor shot. " Presumably, these political leaders are those
he identifies as keeping him from taking over Europe to prepare the
way for the doctrine of eternal return. I have mentioned that to
extend the description of eternal return beyond the range of some
portions of an individual's life to a whole life, and from there to
interpersonal relations and the world is so complex as to defy, I
suspect, all attempts. Nietzsche certainly feels it to be necessary,
though . The Dionysos he celebrates throughout his life is also " the
type of the lawgiver." And , at the very end, he hopes that war will
not be necessary, for " there are still other ways to bring physiology

TH E DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL RETURN

(

293

to honor [die Physiologie zu Ehren zu bringen ] besides military
hospitals .... Well and good, very good in fact: after the old god is
abolished , I am ready, to rule the world. " 117
There was to be no state for Nietzscbe, which is not really
surprising; but to call this demented or megalomaniacal misses the
point. If, in annihilating the Hohenzollern, Nietzsche claims to be
annihilating lies, 118 it is bec-ause he understands that changing ideas
is, in the end , not possible without changing the lives and habits and
indeed the world in which one lives. This theme runs through all of
Nietzsche : our moral behavior, our language, our epistemology, our
institutions, religions, and political practices are of a loose piece. No
more for Nietzsche than for Marx could one make a radical change of
opinion without making a change in the nature of men , in their lives
and world. " Previous philosophers have merely interpreted the
world; the problem, however, is to change it,"'Wrote Marx in the last
of the Theses on Feuerbach. I read this in the same light as the
citation of Wittgenstein which serves as an epigraph to this chapter :
"The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life
of human beings... . " 119 And , it is in this consciousness that we
must understand the last letter which, with one foot over the edge
into insanity, Nietzsche sends to Burckhardt, on January 6, 1889:
" ln the end , I would rather be a Basel professor than God ; but I have
not ventured to carry my private egoism so far as to desist from
creating the world on its account."For Nietzsche, unless that world is
created and made available , the sickness of the time will not be
eradicated.

